Particularism versus Universalism in the Brazilian Public Administration Literature

The author draws on the Brazilian public administration literature to discuss the conflict between the need to remain open to lessons from elsewhere, while at the same time remaining grounded in a particular local context. The article begins by presenting calls by a number of Brazilian public administration scholars for what might be termed an “administrative particularism,” or an assertion that universal lessons do not apply in the discipline. This is followed by a discussion of the challenges that these and other Brazilian public administration scholars identify. Further discussion will suggest these challenges, and many of the solutions most commonly offered for them, imply that, far from a uniquely Brazilian public administration, the country seeks to move closer to the model of public administration practiced elsewhere, especially in the developed world.

Introduction

The contemporary study of public administration as a separate academic discipline is generally seen as having its origins in the United States (Dunshire 1999). As the discipline spread, questions were soon raised about the applicability of lessons learned in this country. Dourival de Souza Carvalho Junior and Sylvia Constant Vergara (1996) indirectly raise the fundamental issue that will be addressed in this article: the conflict between grounding public administration in the national and local context, while avoiding a debilitating “administrative nationalism” that blinds administrators to lessons from elsewhere (135–37).

The importance of context has long been appreciated. In early development studies, Alexander Gerschenkron (1952) and Gunnar Myrdal (1971, 30–45) pointed to the different historical conditions that the industrialized world and the current crop of hopeful industrializers face. O.P. Dwivedi has written more recently that failures in development have occurred because “(1) for many years the western scholars have been unable to include the non-western contributions to developmental studies; (2) ethnocentrism and ignorance in the West have continued to overshadow the need to appreciate the role of local tradition, culture, religion, and style of governance …” (1990, 92). Similarly, Fred Riggs has argued that “a naive willingness to copy American practices and accept American advice is especially dangerous when the American presidentialist regime is equated with democracy. Precisely because the American political system, including its bureaucratic components, is so different from what is normal in other countries, both the American example and the advice given by Americans often produce results that are both unintended and disastrous” (1994, 27).

Gerald Caiden agrees with Riggs, arguing that parochialism “… afflicts too much of the study or science of public administration. Much of what purports to be universalistic is actually highly culture bound and idiosyncratic. Probably Americans are the worst offenders. Too many, ignorant of the world outside the United States, merely generalize about American public administration, not recognizing that American ideas and practices are idiosyncratic and the exception rather than the rule” (1994, 46).

This all appears very healthy. Carl Meacham, however, suggests the down side of this turn to particularism is that “many non-Western transitional states reject approaches used by advanced Western nations, primarily to escape dependency in any form …” (1999, 47).

There is a danger here, though, in throwing out the baby with the bath water. In Meacham’s terms, stymied develop-
opment resulting from rejecting useful lessons learned elsewhere could, paradoxically, increase dependence. In a recent article, Klinger and Washington (2000) discuss this in the U.S. case. The “ignorance of the outside world” pointed to by Caiden certainly renders dubious attempts by Americans (and other developed-world scholars) to extrapolate lessons beyond their own contexts. However, this also suggests that U.S. public administrators miss many important lessons that might be gleaned from elsewhere. For Klinger and Washington, “... parochial assumptions hinder U.S. public administrators from realizing the two fundamental advantages of an international and comparative perspective on public affairs. First, they keep us from learning from the rest of the world and from applying these lessons to our own advantage. Second, they keep us from understanding our own country in context, and from seeing ourselves as others see us” (2000, 36).

This article discusses this debate between enlightening contextual grounding and debilitating “administrative parochialism” in the Brazilian context. It will start by presenting calls by a number of Brazilian public administration scholars for what might be termed an “administrative particularism,” or an assertion that universal lessons do not apply in the discipline. This will be followed by a discussion of the challenges that these and other Brazilian public administration scholars identify. Further discussion will suggest these challenges, and many of the solutions most commonly offered for them, imply that, far from a uniquely Brazilian public administration, the country seeks to move closer to the model of public administration practiced elsewhere, including in the developed world.

**Brazilian Administrative Particularism**

The teaching of public administration in Brazil is widely held to have begun with U.S. help in the 1952 establishment of the Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública (Warlich 1965, 62; Graham 1968, 165–68). Voices soon began to be raised, though, questioning the usefulness of the American—and more broadly, foreign—models that these programs introduced. Alberto Guerreiro Ramos was perhaps the most prominent of Brazil’s first generation of modern scholars of public administration to assert this. For Guerreiro Ramos, many of the development theorists of his era proposed deterministic models, with development involving the rejection of a range of particularistic values in favor of the universalism characteristic of industrialized West (1967, 30). He rejected these ideas, arguing that countries on the periphery did not have to passively follow these examples (39). Public administration was deeply embedded in society (1966, 38–41), and so it did not require systematic theory, but rather “muddling through,” guided by concrete empiricism based in the particular realities of developing countries (208–10; 1973, 186–239).

A strong chorus of voices have since reasserted Guerreiro Ramos’s rejection of “foreign models.” Paulo Roberto Motta criticized development administration that was developed in the North in the 1950s and 1960s. He highlighted a number of limitations of this, including the assumption that “modern” forms of administration could be implemented without problems, and the emphasis in these models on administrative efficiency rather than development effectiveness (1972, 39–2). Armando Moreira da Cunha raised similar concerns, questioning whether American public administration was relevant in Brazil. In particular, Moreira da Cunha pointed to a number of third-world realities that did not apply to the United States, such as inadequate technology, the activities of multinational corporations, political instability, and weakness of the “public” orientation of public administration (1981, 22–26).

Looking at administration at the local level, Carlos Afonso da Silva Oliveira points to problems in the uncritical application of modern administrative practices. He argues that modernization in the mid-1980s Brazilian context often had more to do with elite political squabbles or clientelistic maneuvering (1986, 27).

More recently, the assertion of the irrelevance of foreign models has perhaps increased. Maurício Serva argues that the Weberian model of the public administrator, with merit-based appointees treating her or his office as a “vocation ... a duty ... an acceptance of a specific obligation of faithful management” (Weber 1946), was irrelevant in a country where the patriarchal family continued to exert a strong role in public administration (Serva 1990, 19). Nelson Mello e Souza points out that reforms based on foreign models had gotten nowhere, as these were inconsistent with Brazilian realities. “Instead of trying to achieve a good administrative reform conceived in global terms and in accordance with foreign models, we must confront own realities of underdevelopment, our characteristic social values and political interference” (1994, 63–65).

Cornélia Octávio Pinheiro Pimenta similarly criticizes “the fallacy of a belief in a universal administrative model” (1990, 30), arguing that imported techniques often stymied development. Quoting Riggs, he points out that the development of public administration in Brazil must be based in Brazilian realities (31–32). Carvalho and Vergara point to the American focus of public administration research and argue that a Brazilian public administration theory is needed (1996, 124–25). While seeking to avoid the assertion of an administrative nationalism, the authors join those asserting that Brazilian cultural realities must be considered (135–37) and suggest that comparative research with countries similar to Brazil—such as Italy, Spain, and Argentina—is needed (133). Lenaura Lobato asserts the im-
importance of the local sociopolitical reality in policy formulation in Latin America, arguing that pluralism in the American model didn’t apply in societies characterized by large state sectors, clientelism, and weak democratic consolidation (1997, 37–41). Finally, others have argued much the same more broadly in Brazilian political science. Antốnio Carlos Wolkmer questions whether a uniquely Brazilian political thinking exists, rather than the country simply imitating foreign trends (1988, 25–26), Celso Furtado has similarly criticized Brazil for reflexively adopting ideas from outside (1996, 7), and Raymundo Faoro probably put it best in his 1987 article, “Existe um pensamento político brasileiro?”

Brazilian Administrative Challenges

To sum up the discussion thus far, there is an issue within the public administration literature concerning whether the “mainstream” public administration literature generated in the advanced industrial democracies of the North is relevant in the South. It also has been demonstrated that these concerns are amply reflected in the Brazilian literature. This article now turns to assessing whether these claims have merit.

One might begin by assessing the problems addressed by public administration scholars in Brazil. On the surface, the country seems to deal with many of the same issues that the developed country public administration literature addresses. The broader literature includes recurring issues that northerners would find familiar, such as corruption and accountability (Brei 1996; Silva 1994; Faoro 1977), participation (Gohn 1997; Gondim 1988; Oliveira 1968), decentralization (Pimenta 1995; Silva 1987; Venâncio Filho 1960), economic policy (Tavares de Almeida 1996; Bresser Pereira 1987; Prado Júnior 1963) and administrative reform (Souza 1994; Neves 1981; Warlich 1965), among others. Similarly, in a 1994 survey of articles in Revista de Administração Pública, Tânia Margarete Mezzomo and Claudio Bucci Laporta identify three distinct phases in the evolution of the journal and, by extension, given its prominence among mainstream public administration scholars, the discipline. Mezzomo and Laporta argue that the discipline tended to focus on development issues of public administration from 1967 to 1979. The emphasis was indicated by an (informal) motto: technical competence and rationality (1994, 10). As the military government lost its developmentalist legitimacy and Brazilians tired of repression, Mezzomo and Laporta argue that political concerns came to the fore in public administration scholarship in the 1980s. The growth of social movements, agitation for democratization, openness, participation, and similar themes dominated. It was only during the 1990s that Brazilian public administration became a discipline focusing on public administration itself.

“The new context demands administrators able to administer democratically and to manage community participation. Added to political competence to reconcile social demands and cope with the relations of power between the State and society should be technical capacity to define priorities and goals, to formulate strategies and generate resources” (14).

Again, many of the same themes found in Revista de Administração Pública can be found in Public Administration Review. Yet these superficial similarities hide great differences in the magnitude of the issues dealt with. First, the development differences between the two regions are well appreciated, and these are defined in such a manner as to dramatically change the nature of the problems faced by developed and developing country public administrators. In turning to address “some of the administrative obstacles” in developing countries, Riggs points out that “… examples of every kind of administrative weakness noted in foreign countries may also be found in the United States. The chief difference is, perhaps, that other countries cannot afford administrative waste as well as we can” (1964, 244).

Riggs might also have added that the magnitude of the problems faced in the South is far greater (and the assumption underlies much of his early development administration work; 1964, 244–59). This hardly needs demonstrating; indeed, this underdevelopment defines these countries. Despite Brazil’s long self-image of (and hope for) itself as “the country of the future” (Eakin 1998, 1), many Brazilians would still agree with Paulo Prado’s 1928 epitaph that “in a radiant land live a sad people” (9). Despite an impressive array of industries and a diverse economy, the benefits of this development have not been enjoyed by large segments of the population. National income figures remain well below developed-country levels, and human development has tarried even further behind (UNDP 1999, 135).

However, the emphasis on the cultural uniqueness of Brazil, offered by many Brazilian scholars to explain the need for a unique Brazilian public administration literature, ironically points to the great similarities between public administration in Brazil and elsewhere. Many Brazilian public administration scholars cite precisely this cultural legacy as a key problem to be overcome. The cultural origins of the country have long been cited to explain its administrative difficulties. Classic works such as Gilberto Freyre’s Casa-Grande e Senzala (1978), Victor Nunes Leal’s Coronelismo (1948), Nelson Werneck Sodré’s Formação da Sociedade Brasileira (1944), Paulo Prado’s Retrato do Brasil (1928), and Alberto Torres’s O Problema Nacional Brasileiro (1978) note the authoritarian individualism of Brazil’s early settlement. In contrast to the state-
led model of settlement, which characterized the French and Spanish colonies, Brazil’s early settlement was characterized by private initiative, with the family, rather than the individual, the key unit. Slavery further exacerbated the authoritarian tendencies of this paternalistic patriarchy. The formal political system was easily suborned to these informal social relations, as local self-government operated on a property-based suffrage. Whatever moderating influence might have been exercised by (often equally patronage-driven) state and federal governments was nullified by the great de facto local autonomy that states and localities enjoyed. Patrimonialism, clientelism, and the suborning of public to private interests came to characterize public administration (Freyre 1978,19; Leal 1948; Torres 1978, 44–45; Prado 1928; Sodre 1944, 73–104).

Similarly, Caio Prado Junior’s Evolução Política do Brasil opens with a reference to “the characteristically feudal origin of the regime of the captaincies.”” (1966,13). Celso Furtado’s The Economic Growth of Brazil roots Brazil’s relative economic stagnation in the dominance of large, slave-holding landowners. Slavery depressed wages of free labor and inhibited further European immigration. Even among the always more numerous free laborers, social links tying tenants to landowners reinforced these trends (Furtado 1963,107–34; see also Leal 1948, 13–24). The result was a public administration that was “public” in name only. As Nelson Wenmek Sodre argued over a half-century ago, “This absorption of public affairs by private property lays across our history—for four centuries, in spite of all alterations, internal and external—and arrives at the present day in this evident confusion, which we still come across at each turn, between what is private and what is public … in Brazil…. We have a very powerful, very strong, very weighty inheritance of privatism, of public affairs subordinated to private interests, and our society has only evolved on the outside, at depth it still remains quite colonial” (1944, 99; see also Torres 1978, 23).6

From these inauspicious roots the country successively went through 80 years of empire, 20 odd years of the Novo Estado, and more recently, 20 years of military government, which ended only in 1985. Novelist Jorge Amado perhaps summed up the ditadura best: “Censorship, corruption, and violence were the tools of government; this must be recalled because there are some who may have forgotten it now. It was a time of ignominy and fear: The jails were overflowing, and there was torture and torturers, the lie of the ‘Brazilian miracle,’ pharaonic public projects, and graft” (1993, 105).

Despite having justified the 1964 coup partly by the need for administrative reform (see, for instance, Visão 1964), the very serious limitations of the Brazilian state remained on abertura in the mid-1970s and on return to democratic rule in the 1980s. Maria Carvalho and Helena Tonet note the need to change the negative aspects of Brazil’s public-service culture (1994, 151). The current culture is characterized by low salaries, little understanding of organizational roles and career paths, the performance of limited and repetitive tasks, and the prevalence of personal interests over those of the public. The result is an attitude of accommodation, rigidity, morosity, and low esteem7 within the public service (144–46). The authors suggest improving individual performance within the public sector and increased public participation as solutions (148–51).

Pedro Paulo Carbone reaffirms the historical roots of organizational authoritarianism—the tendency for Brazilian organizations to adopt a rigid, hierarchical management structure (1991, 89; see also Silva 1987, 93–95). With strong control at the center, managers become hard to replace on retirement, death, or departure (91). Flexibility is lost, so that management is often unable to adjust to changed circumstances (92). Finally, there is an absence of feedback and little communication, so that valuable input from others is not incorporated into the organization’s closed decision-making process (95–98).

Maurício Serva notes that in a patriarchal society, personal ties outweigh merit in decision making. Further, he suggests that indifference and ritualism are Brazilian cultural traits, further inhibiting the efficient functioning of bureaucracies (1990, 19). Anna Maria Campos addresses the broad issues raised by Serva at a more fundamental level. “In the more modern democratic societies it is accepted as natural and expected that the government—and the public service—will be responsible before the citizens” (1990, 30). She suggests that public accountability is so foreign to Brazilian culture that it cannot even be translated into Portuguese. As a result, the government wastes money and disrespects the public, which reacts with an attitude of passive acceptance of favoritism, nepotism, corruption, bribery, and wasted resources (31). This lack of accountability (and bureaucratic authoritarianism) is the result of both weak institutions and the low level of organization in civil society and participation in the policy process (42).

Luciano Zajdsnajder emphasizes the social embeddedness of Brazilian public administration. In a society in which levels of civil development differ, the “private appetites” of more sophisticated groups are likely to predominate, leaving public administration in “ruins.” Authority in Brazilian public administration is too often substituted by force, and control of public bodies falls to these interests or groups. Repression and corruption are common (1984, 93–94). Gleisi Neves raises similar themes, listing a range of governmental dysfunctions including formalism, forgetting ends as a result of focusing on means, a fascination with size, the fragmentation of activities often obscuring a vision of the whole, resistance to change,
a lack of initiative, excessive technocracy, a lack of respect for humanity, and an attachment to status symbols (1981, 34–40). Eli Diniz perhaps sums up this scholarly criticism of the failures of the Brazilian state best: While itemizing many of the problems described in the preceding paragraphs (see 1997, 26), a fundamental contradiction exists between the formally strong, centralized state and the reality of a weak ability to implement policy (17), and an equally weak system of public accountability (179–83). The result was often the “privatization” of the bureaucratic apparatus by interest groups (25).

This scholarly impression of the public sector as woefully inadequate is reflected in the public’s perceptions. Writing only five years after redemocratization, Bernardo Jablonski and Arnoldo Rodrigues report that the public image of politics was bad and getting worse (1990, 42–43). Politicians were seen as ambitious, insincere, deceitful, opportunistic, clever, unconcerned with the public good, corrupt, and egoistic (46). Even among the political and economic elite, one report finds deep cynicism concerning Brazil’s leadership. Forty-two percent blamed deficiencies among the elite themselves for Brazil’s backwardness, while attaching responsibility for the major problems in the country to government (42 percent), the elite (23 percent), politicians (10 percent), and Congress (7 percent). Only 1 percent blamed the Brazilian people for the country’s major problems (Nascimento Neto and Grinbaum 1996).

These criticisms imply administrative-reform goals much such as those espoused in developed countries: accountability, responsiveness, public-spiritedness, fiscal rectitude, meritocracy, and the rule of law. Brazilians advocating economic reform have raised similar themes. Privatization and open trade policies are advocated as mechanisms to discipline and reform government. Whether they are seen as “neo-liberal” policies; justified as “the ideological matrix most adequate to guide modernizing forces and to drive the social dynamic in the direction of a new order” (Diniz 1997, 27); or as a Brazilian manifestation of the same, pragmatic New Public Management adopted by governments as ideologically diverse as Margaret Thatcher’s United Kingdom and Roger Lange’s New Zealand (Bresser Pereira 1998, 18–20, 52–58); these reforms have drawn openly and heavily on foreign experience. Given the litany of weaknesses presented above, protectionist trade policies and state-led development have come to be seen by many as the source of Brazil’s problems rather than the cure. Bresser Pereira preaches the virtues of stabilization, privatization, and liberalization, noting that Latin America’s crisis was one of the state and the old nationalist-development approach, with its state-led development behind tariff walls (Bresser Pereira 1993, 38–39). Hermínia Tavares de Almeida agrees, criticizing the military governments for centralization, closing the economy, and an excessive public role in the economy. Worse, she notes that the leftist opposition “shared with the political, military and technocratic elites elites favorable to the regime the same faith in strategies of development conducted by the state” (1996, 220–21).

Martins Filho offers two complementary explanations for the crisis of the state. On the one hand, the crisis represents a crisis of Fordism, with its government-led development through large, state-owned enterprises generally proving unable to compete on global markets; this is made worse by the “cartorialismo, corruption and clientelismo” that characterizes the Brazilian state. On the other hand, Martins Filho suggests the crisis represents the bankruptcy of Vargas’s Novo Estado. In an inflationary environment, the political spoils system that is the legacy of varguista corporatism bankrupted the state, strengthening the liberal, minimal state as an option (1996, 98–103). Belmiro Valverde Castor concurs, arguing there are few doubts that the model of public administration, in the form conceived and implanted from 1930, entered in absolute and definite collapse during the 1980s (1994, 155). Inflation and budget deficits had eroded the efficiency of a state apparatus already riddled with clientelism, corporatism and populism (156–58). Earlier, Castor and Célio França argued that the varguista centralist fascination with scale, uniformity, modernity, and control of the environment had broken down, exhausted. Significantly, while the model had worked adequately through much of the twentieth century, modern society became too complex for the state to manage from the center (1986, 7–13). Decentralization was called for, with much of this management coming from civil society (22). In short, the issue may be as seen by current reformist (and deeply embattled and unpopular as a result) President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Cardoso has referred to his goals as not so much about privatization of the public sector, in the sense of selling assets to private hands, but rather as about deprivatization: “… ensuring that it will be more permeable to the aspirations of society and less susceptible to be controlled by sectoral, private interests.”10 (Cardoso 1997b, 7; see also 1997b; 1998, 9).

Discussion

From the discussion above, it should be evident that the magnitude alone of the policy issues facing Brazilian public administration might justify the development of a Brazilian literature, focusing on uniquely Brazilian solutions to these problems that few developed countries experience. Brazilians would be justified in looking little to lessons learned elsewhere, especially those gleaned from the industrialized world.
However, on further analysis, it has been shown this should not be taken too far. Despite assertions to the contrary, the broad goals of public administration appear to be remarkably like those of the developed world. This is also reflected in the vagueness of the solutions offered by those asserting a need for a uniquely Brazilian public administration literature. Details are sketchy. Carvalho and Vergara urge Brazilian public administration researchers to recognize local conditions in their research (1996, 134–37), but they have little to say about what uniquely Brazilian administrative principles might come from this. Lobato similarly urges that the local sociopolitical reality be understood in policy formulation (1997, 39–40) and dismisses pluralism as an American model conforming to U.S. realities (41), yet fails to indicate what sort of nonpluralistic policy alternatives might be put forth. Indeed, in a broad literature that both applauds the growing strength of Brazilian civil society and advocates more participation in the policy process by these groups (Candler 2000), rejecting pluralism seems out of place. Mello e Souza calls for a vague pragmatism (1994). Pimenta criticizes universalistic models without describing a particularly Brazilian model (1990, 30–31).

As a result, there appears to be a tautological loop in these arguments. There are wide calls for administrative reform in Brazil, many of which imply trying to introduce processes or values common in public administration in the developed world. Yet a number of Brazilian public administration scholars seek to reject a vague, ill-defined Western model. For example, Nelson Mello e Souza calls for administrative reform, in the sense of ending the oligarchy of rural elites and their corruption, cronyism, and other administrative pathologies. However, he criticizes administrative reform conceived in global terms, arguing instead that reform should confront Brazilian realities and social and political characteristics. Yet it is precisely this political interference and these social values that many Brazilians identify as contributing to Brazil’s own “reality of underdevelopment,” and that global norms of meritocracy, accountability, and transparency seek to replace.

Similarly, Pimenta’s caution that merit-based recruitment threatens the survival of elites whose power is based on patrimonialist clientelism appears redundant. Threatening the survival of patrimonial elites is precisely the goal of meritocratic hiring practices. Serva’s dismissal of universality, science, neutrality, rationality, modernity, instrumental rationality, and so forth as elements of the “myth” of imported administrative methods (Serva 1992, 134–42), appears equally confusing when the opposites of these traits are often precisely the problems that many Brazilian public administrators identify.

A distinction, then, needs to be made between those aspects of the Western model that are peculiarly North American and European, and those that are indeed universal goals that just happened to develop in the modern era first in the developed countries. Developed-world lessons appear less useful in transport policy, poverty alleviation, higher education funding, and any number of similar specific, context-critical policy issues. However, universalistic prescriptions may apply in many other areas, especially concerning the broad goals and values driving public administration. These include many of the areas specifically rejected in the readings cited above, such as modernity, rationality, neutrality, science, accountability, meritocracy, and pluralism.

Conclusion

Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe has addressed the issue in another context. When the authenticity of his African artistic expression was questioned because he used a Western medium (the novel), Achebe responded that writing about African realities in a medium first developed in the West made his work no more European than did the use of trombones and pianos make jazz European (1975, 27). Despite his emphasis on the importance of context, mentioned in opening this article, Fred Riggs has come to much the same conclusion. Noting that bureaucracy has been both an instrument of repression in some societies and a force for good in others, he argues that the reason for this difference cannot be found in the nature of the bureaucratic structures themselves. “The key variable has not been any fundamental transformation in the structure of bureaucratic organization—rather, it has involved the establishment of new political structures able to maintain popular control over the conduct and performance of appointed public officials” (1997, 347).

Or, as Alberto Torres argues, “the best model that they [the United States] offer us is not in their material civilization, but in the moral and intellectual culture of their society” (1978, 98). It is correct then, that many of the structures of the industrialized world are peculiar, and many of the current and past development lessons of these countries, too, are of little relevance outside of their spatial and temporal origins. But many of the basic, even Weberian “moral and intellectual” principles that underlie public administration in these countries remain universally relevant.
Notes

1. All translations by the author. “Em vez de tentar alcançar uma boa reforma administrativa concebida em termos globais de acordo com modelos estrangeiros, temos que enfrentar nossas próprias realidades de subdesenvolvimento, nossos valores sociais característicos e a interferência política.”

2. “A falácia da crença em um modelo administrativo universal.”

3. “Does a Brazilian political thought exist?”

4. “O novo contexto exige administradores públicos capazes de administrar democraticamente e gerenciar a participação das comunidades. À competência política para conciliar demandas sociais e conviver com as relações de poder entre Estado e sociedade deve somar-se capacidade técnica para definir prioridades e metas, formular estratégias e gerir recursos.”

5. “O regime das capitâncias em princípio caracteristicamente feudal.”

6. “Essa absorção da coisa pública pela propriedade privada atravessa a nossa história, por quatro séculos, apesar de tôdas as alterações, internas e externas, e chega até os nossos dias, nessa evidente confusão, com que é público, coisas e planos em plena confusão... no Brasil... Temos uma poderosa, fortíssima, pesadíssima herança de privatismo, de coisa pública subordinada a interesses privados, e a nossa sociedade só evoluiu por fora, no fundo ainda permanece bastante colonial.”

7. Carvalho and Tonet use the word “descredito,” or discredit.

8. “Nas sociedades democráticas mais modernas aceita-se como natural e espera-se que os governos — e o serviço público — sejam responsáveis perante os cidadãos.”

9. “Compartilhava com as elites políticas, militares e tecnocráticas favoráveis ao regime a mesma fé nas estratégias de desenvolvimento conduzidas pelo Estado.”

10. “Assegurando que ele seja mais permeável às aspirações da sociedade e menos suscetível de ser controlado por interesses setoriais, privados.”

11. “O melhor modelo que eles nos oferecem não está em sua civilização material, senão na cultura moral e intelectual da sua sociedade.”

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