Rico Vitz

RESEARCH

OVERVIEW

My area of specialization is the history of philosophy in 17th and 18th century Europe. My research program, within that area, focuses on questions concerning moral psychology and has two principal goals. First, it aims to elucidate the way in which Rene Descartes and David Hume explain the cognitive mechanisms and processes that cause moral behavior and, ultimately, result in the development of moral character. Second, when possible, it aims to clarify what contemporary philosophers can learn from these explanations.

The following are brief descriptions of

my present research project - Descartes's Ethics of Belief,

my future research project - Hume's Psychology of Religious Belief,

my earlier research project - Hume on Sympathy and Benevolence.

DESCARTES'S ETHICS OF BELIEF

I am currently developing a monograph in which I elucidate Descartes's conception of ‘virtuous belief formation’—i.e., the cognitive mechanisms and processes by which people both do and, more importantly, ought to form their beliefs. The text has been conditionally accepted for publication by Springer/Kluwer Academic.

In a related paper, “Descartes and the Question of Direct Doxastic Voluntarism,” I elucidate Descartes's account of the nature of belief and show that he propounds a kind of direct doxastic voluntarism. The paper was recently accepted for publication and will appear in the Journal of Philosophical Research in 2010.

HUME'S PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF

My longer term goal is to develop a series of articles and, ultimately, a monograph on Hume’s naturalistic psychology of religious belief. I currently have drafts of three papers related to this project.

In “Doxastic Virtues as Moral Virtues in Hume’s Epistemology,” I argue that Hume regards virtues concerning belief formation as moral virtues and argue that recognizing this fact is significant for contemporary epistemological discussions, which tend to focus on an Aristotelian conception of doxastic virtues.

In “Lies, Captivating Lies, and Religious Belief,” for which I was awarded an NEH Summer Stipend (Summer 2008), I argue that on Hume's account, one morally illegitimate, cause of religious belief among the educated, or ‘learned elite’, is a form of self-deception.

In "Hume on 'the Irresistible Contagion of Opinion'," which was invited for presentation at the Hume Society Conference (2011), I explain Hume's account of how people acquire beliefs as a result of sympathizing with the opinions of others.

HUME ON SYMPATHY AND BENEVOLENCE

My earlier papers focus on Hume’s account of the scope and causes of benevolence.

In “Sympathy and Benevolence in Hume’s Moral Psychology” (Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2004), I argue that a careful reading of Hume’s Treatise and his second Enquiry reveals that, contrary to what many had argued, Hume never abandoned the view that sympathy is a psychological mechanism that causes benevolence.

In “Hume and the Limits of Benevolence” (Hume Studies, 2002), I show that a careful reading of Hume’s Treatise and his second Enquiry reveals that although Hume does identify a kind of ‘partial benevolence’ that is limited in the way that scholars had previously suggested, he also recognizes the existence of an ‘extensive benevolence’ that can include any sensible creature whose condition is “brought near to us, and represented in lively colours.”